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 In an article entitled “Should Democracies Sanction Democracies?” Avia Pasternak 
observes that there are three areas of concern about a state sanctioning another state when 
that other state is violating human rights.1 First, there are concerns about whether sanctions 
are an effective means of bringing about a change in policy. Second, there are concerns about 
whether other states have a right to interfere in the decisions of the sanctioned state. Third, 
there are concerns about whether there really is an obligation for other states to interfere. 
Unless the human rights violations are atrocities on a large scale, these general concerns may 
well point to a No answer to the question of whether other states should sanction a given state. 
But Pasternak thinks that when our focus is on democratic states alone – when the question is 
whether a democratic state should sanction another democratic state – there are specific 
considerations which can serve to overturn this No answer, even if the human rights 
violations are relatively small scale. In this paper, I focus on her attempt to argue that one 
democratic state can have a right to sanction another democratic state. 
                                               
1  Avia Pasternak, “Should Democracies Sanction Democracies?” in E-International Relations (August 12th 
2008), http://www.e-ir.info/2008/08/13/should-democracies-sanction-democracies/ 
 
  
2 
 
 In order for Pasternak’s argument to be of interest, we need to grant that states in 
general do not have a right to sanction other states merely as part of deciding on their own 
policies. If states in general have such a right, then there is no need to argue that there are 
features of democratic states and their relationships which give rise to such a right, in certain 
circumstances. So let us grant that states in general do not have such a right. 
 Granting this point, Pasternak argues as follows: 
…when one democracy adopts an undemocratic practice, it sends the message to 
other democracies that such behaviour is compatible with democratic norms. Other 
democracies that are in close contact with it could therefore potently be influenced 
themselves by these changing norms. In order to prevent this detrimental effect they 
have a right to express their outright condemnation of this behaviour. In other words, 
in order to preserve their own democratic identity these other democracies have the 
right to make it clear that they reject the non-democratic policies of the liberal 
democracy with which they are in close contact.2 
In this passage, Pasternak does not actually mention sanctions, rather condemnation. But the 
question of her article, as indicated by its title, is whether democracies should sanction other 
democracies when they engage in certain violations. This passage is the only material in the 
article that plausibly supports a right for democracies to sanction other democracies. So we 
must either say that, contrary to her aim, Pasternak has no argument for this right, or else 
adapt the material. It is possible to take the second option and I shall take it. The final 
quotation I provide from Pasternak in this paper justifies taking it. 
Adapting what she says, Pasternak seems to be making an argument that involves 
three premises: 
                                               
2 Ibid. 
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(1) A democratic state has a right to take appropriate means to protect its democratic 
culture. 
(2) If democratic state A and democratic state B are in close contact and state A violates 
some democratic norms, then the democratic culture of state B is under threat, 
because citizens of state B may regard the norm-violating actions of state A as in fact 
acceptable behaviour for a democratic state. 
(3) An appropriate means of protecting state B’s democratic culture from this specific 
threat is for state B to sanction state A. 
From these premises, the following conclusion is drawn: 
(4) If democratic state A and democratic state B are in close contact and state A violates 
some democratic norms, then state B has a right to sanction state A. 
In my evaluation of this argument, I contest the third premise. It is possible to qualify this 
argument considerably without affecting the points I make regarding this premise. Before 
coming to the evaluation, it is worth briefly pointing out a couple of assumptions that 
Pasternak makes, assumptions that I will not contest. 
 A question that is likely to occur to some readers is whether a democratic state which 
violates some democratic norms is still a democratic state. I think Pasternak is assuming that 
a state can still qualify as a democratic state while violating some such norms. Of course, this 
gives rise to another question: where should we draw the line? I will pass over this other 
question here. A second assumption of hers is that if a democratic state violates human rights, 
then it is violating some democratic norms, or liberal-democratic norms, to be more precise. 
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This assumption is worth looking into, but I will not look into it here. (Pasternak’s focus is, 
more precisely, on liberal-democracies.3) 
Pasternak’s argument is very original, but there is an objection to premise (3). If 
democratic state A and democratic state B are in close contact and state A violates some 
democratic norms, leaving the democratic culture of state B under threat, because the actions 
of state A may be regarded as acceptable behaviour, is there not a straightforward way for 
state B to protect its democratic culture? The government of state B can just provide an 
argument to citizens for why the norm-violating actions of state A are violations of 
democratic norms. A good argument is needed, otherwise sanctions cannot be justified; but if 
there is a good argument, why can it not be presented to citizens of democratic state B instead 
of pursuing sanctions? Hopefully, citizens will recognize that the argument is good and then 
they will not believe that the norm-violating actions of state A are in fact acceptable 
behaviour for a democratic state. Given that this means of protecting the democratic culture 
of state B is available, how can one say that sanctions are an appropriate means? Since we are 
granting that a state does not have a right to sanction another state unless special 
circumstances obtain, I think we have to say that a means of protecting democratic culture 
which involves sanctions cannot be appropriate when there is this peaceful non-interfering 
means available. Whatever the full requirements for appropriateness, they have surely not 
been met. 
A defence against my objection is that perhaps most citizens of state B have some 
irrational attachment to the belief that state A always behaves in a way that is acceptable for a 
                                               
3 For a definition of liberal democracy, see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2010), 14-15. See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University 
Press 1993), 14. 
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democratic state. Even when presented with a good argument to the contrary, they continue to 
believe this. The only way to protect the democratic culture of state B is to change the 
behaviour of state A. Even if this is true, just imagine a member of state B’s government 
reasoning along the following lines: “Our state has a right to sanction state A, because we 
have presented a good argument to citizens of our state that the actions of state A are 
violations of democratic norms, but unfortunately the argument has not made any difference 
to their beliefs.” I am disposed to say, “You do not gain a right to interfere in the affairs of 
another state because citizens of your own state will not listen to reason! That is too great a 
violation of the other state’s right to self-determination, because this right is compromised 
owing to the unreceptivity to reason of people beyond its boundaries.” (Also note that, 
whatever the other state is doing, to try to affect your citizens’ beliefs in this way is itself a 
serious violation of liberal-democratic norms. This route does not engage with sane adult 
citizens as people who can make their own minds up, given adequate information.) 
Towards the end of her article, Pasternak writes as if protecting the democratic culture 
of a state is not meant to function as a complete reason for pursuing sanctions, but only in 
conjunction with other reasons: 
The justification for sanctioning would be not only that the democracy in question 
violated international law and harmed a third party, but also that it violated the 
democratic norms which it shares in common with other democracies and which it 
professes allegiance to.4 
But if the protecting-culture reason is objectionable when considered in isolation, in the way I 
have found it objectionable, it is unclear what difference it would make to add it to the reason 
that international law is being violated and that a third party is being harmed. If these two 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
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reasons do not in themselves give a right to sanction, if something else must be added, I 
cannot see how the something else is protecting the democratic culture of one’s state. For 
there is the option of protecting it by providing an argument to citizens of that state; and one 
does not gain a right to sanction if that option fails. 
Beyond having a right to pursue sanctions, I cannot see how the reason she identifies 
adds to a case for actually pursuing sanctions. Pasternak asserts that it adds to a case in 
another article: 
…B has an increased right, and a better reason, to interfere in the affairs of A in order 
to reduce the risk of future damage to its own democratic culture.5 
However, Pasternak once again overlooks the option of protecting one’s democratic culture 
through giving reasons and does not address the concerns about pursuing other options if this 
overlooked option fails. I find Pasternak’s argument interesting. It may be that there is some 
highly qualified variation on it that applies to a very specific context, but I cannot see that the 
argument in its current form works. 
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